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This paper examines the impact of monetary policy on firms’ access to bank and market 
finance  when  allowance  is  made  for  differences  in  firm-specific  characteristics.    A 
theoretical model determines the cut-off values for project profitability that would allow 
firms to access bank or market finance.  This model predicts that specific characteristics in 
terms of size, age, risk and debt can make a firm more vulnerable to tightening credit when 
interest  rates  increase.  Empirically,  the  paper  shows,  using  a  panel  of  16,000  UK  firm 
records over 10 years, that firms distributed according to their type (asset size, rating etc) 
do have differing access to bank lending and market finance. Small, young and risky firms 
are  more  significantly  affected  by  tight  monetary  conditions  than  large,  old  and  secure 
firms. The evidence is consistent with a credit channel, and demonstrates that there are 
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1.  Introduction 
A considerable body of literature has built up to explore the credit channel of monetary transmission 
including papers by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Romer and Romer (1990), Friedman and Kuttner 
(1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) to mention just a few. The influence of this channel is felt 
through the balance sheet (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), the effects of bank lending on those firms 
that are particularly bank dependent (Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993) and through the stimulation 
of endogenous cycles or accelerator effects (Fuerst, 1995; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, Bernanke et 
al., 1999). Financial health is used as an indicator to determine firms’ access to internal and external 
funds, so that when monetary policy tightens real variables such as employment, production, sales, 
investment  and  inventory  accumulation  decisions  are  influenced  by  higher  interest  rates  and  by 
contracting  credit  supply  (Fazzari  et  al.,  1988,  Guariglia  and  Schiantarelli,  1998,  Nickell  and 
Nicolitsis, 1999, and Guariglia, 1999). The point here is that access to credit is determined by firm-
specific characteristics and therefore the effects of monetary policy contractions are unlikely to be 
uniform. In fact, the question of just how influential the credit channel might be, and which firms are 
most affected by it, is an important issue for monetary policy makers. Our paper tackles this subject. 
A key empirical issue for researchers has been the identification of the credit channel as a 
separate  influence  from  other  channels  –  such  as  the  interest  rate  channel,  for  example.  Early 
attempts  to  measure  the  influence  of  policy  tightening  on  the  level  of  bank  lending  did  not 
distinguish between demand-side influences, operating through the liabilities side of banks balance 
sheets (via the interest rate channel), and supply shifts, and therefore could not establish beyond 
doubt that there was a separate credit channel.  But a seminal contribution by Kashyap et al. (1993) 
isolated the influence of monetary policy contractions on bank lending by measuring the relative 
changes of bank lending to non-bank sources of funds. They did so by constructing a ‘mix’ variable 
defined as the ratio of bank lending to total external finance (bank lending plus commercial paper). 
With such a relative measure based on the mix the effect of the interest rate channel on all types of 
finance could be distinguished from a credit channel on bank lending alone. When Kashyap et al. 
(1993)  showed  that  the  mix  between  bank  lending  and  market-based  finance  declined  with  a 
monetary contraction in the US they provided strong support for the credit channel in general and 
the bank lending channel in particular.  
Subsequent  work  by  Oliner  and  Rudebusch  (1996)  offered  a  critique  of  Kashyap  et  al.  
(1993). While they were convinced by the use of a mix variable to capture the relative adjustment in 
the financial portfolio, they were unsure whether Kashyap et al. (1993) had used the correct mix.   3
They argued that the original mix variable did not take into account a sufficiently wide range of 
alternative sources of finance and did not account for differential effects on small as opposed to 
large firms. Small firms are almost entirely bank dependent and therefore their mix is likely to be 
invariant to the monetary policy stance.  With a wider measure of alternative funds and a distinction 
between small and large firms, Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) showed that there was less evidence 
for a credit channel than had been originally supposed. Nevertheless, they found that the broad 
credit channel, which implies that all sources of funds contract simultaneously as monetary policy 
tightens,  leaving  the  mix  unaffected,  does  exist.  They  concluded  that  disaggregation  fails  to 
substantiate that the mix changes as policy tightens, as they could find no evidence to support a bank 
lending channel, either in aggregate or for small or large firms separately. 
Kashyap  et  al.  (1996)  responded  by  arguing  that  the  re-interpretation  of  Oliner  and 
Rudebusch  (1996)  was  misleading.  The  implication  that  the  mix  does  not  respond  to  monetary 
policy when the data is disaggregated, they argued, is entirely expected for small firms (because 
they are bank dependent at all times) and an artefact of the different measure of the mix for large 
firms. When Kashyap et al. (1996) recalculated the effects for small and large firms using their own 
definition of the mix their original results were upheld.  
The interchange between Kashyap et al. (1993, 1996) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) is 
far from a minor dispute. It touches on an important issue for the credit channel – the influence of 
firm-specific characteristics on the response to monetary contractions. If factors such as the size of 
the  firm  –  to  take  the  characteristic  chosen  by  Oliner  and  Rudebusch  (1996)  –  can  have  an 
influential  effect  on  the  composition  of  finance,  then  other  characteristics  may  also  alter  the 
responsiveness  to  monetary  policy.  In  other  words,  why  consider only size? In their conclusion 
Kashyap et al. (1996) note that there is ‘more to be learned from careful analysis of a variety of 
micro data, at the level of both individual banks and individual firms’ p. 313, and we agree. Now 
that micro data is accessible on other aspects of firm characteristics, such as their balance sheet, real 
assets, perceived riskiness and indebtedness, in panels spanning periods of both tight and benign 
monetary policy, we can consider their effects. The influence of the above factors on firms’ access 
to bank versus market-based finance when monetary policy is altered is the point that the present 
paper addresses
1.   
Our  paper  extends  the  theoretical  model  of  Hoshi,  Kashyap  and  Scharfstein  (1993)  by 
introducing a variable opportunity cost of funds in order to examine the effects of monetary policy 
                                                            
1 Kishan and Opiela (2000) use a similar methodology with bank balance sheet data to offer support for the lending 
channel.   4
on corporate financing. The minimum conditions that a firm must satisfy in order to access finance 
from an intermediary or from the market are then defined in terms of the scale of the financial 
payoff to investment in relation to its asset size. If a firm exceeds some minimum cut-off value it 
will obtain bank finance, and if it exceeds a higher cut-off value it will obtain market finance. 
Clearly the proximity of profitability to the cut-off values will depend on monetary conditions but 
also, crucially from the point of view of the credit channel, on firm-specific characteristics, which 
are the basis that credit providers use to identify creditworthy applicants. The predictions from our 
model are evaluated for a panel of 16,000 manufacturing firms in the UK. Our results show that the 
more financially vulnerable firms – smaller, younger, more risky and more indebted firms – are 
more severely affected by monetary tightening as their profitability declines and the cut-off values 
they face become more exacting. Thus we offer empirical support for the theoretical model, and can 
quantify the effects of particular characteristics on the responsiveness to monetary policy.. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical model to explore the 
influence  of  firm-specific  characteristics  on  the  mix  as  monetary  policy  contracts  or  expands. 
Section 3 explains the predictions of the model. The data sources and methodology are discussed in 
Section 4, and then Section 5 presents the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Theoretical Model 
We extend a theoretical model based on the framework suggested by Diamond (1991) in which the 
interaction  between  a  firm’s  reputation  capital  (a  good  track  record)  and  the  choice  between 
intermediary and market finance is analysed in the context of delegating monitoring
2. Initially used 
by Hoshi et al. (1993) to analyse ownership structure and external finance in Japan, our application 
is different as we explicitly introduce the interest rate to derive the implications of monetary policy 
decisions. 
  Our main interest in this paper is to understand how firm characteristics influence the effects 
of monetary policy on the ability of firms to raise funds from either capital markets or from banks. 
As Hoshi et al. (1993) demonstrated we can derive a taxonomy of firms according to their source of 
finance that depends on their individual characteristics, such as age, size, total assets, short- and 
long-term liabilities, credit ratings, and solvency and gearing ratios. Our main contribution is to 
analyse the effects of changes in monetary policy on the above taxonomy. More specifically, there 
                                                            
2 Other significant papers by Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Repullo and Suarez (2000) 
and Bolton and Freixas (2000) have analysed the choice between market and intermediary finance as affected by the net 
worth value of firms.    5
are two kinds of predictions that we derive and subsequently test. First, we would like to know the 
direct effects of monetary policy changes on financial choice. This is straightforward, but monetary 
policy also has some indirect effects. It is well documented in the literature, that financial choices of 
firms  also  depend  on  their  individual  characteristics  due  to  the  screening  process  of  financial 
intermediaries  offering  credit,  for  example.  Therefore,  our  second  objective  is  to  understand 
whether these indirect effects are also influenced by monetary policy. Of course, we would also like 
to make sure that the standard first order effects of individual characteristics on financial choice are 
corroborated by our new data. The remainder of this section and the next carefully document the 
model and its predictions to ensure that our contribution is clearly stated. 
We assume that firms own a certain amount of total assets (AT), which consist of tangible 
collateral assets (AC), intangible assets, and existing debt (DE), which is less than collateral assets 
and thus it is riskless.  Potential investment projects generate financial payoffs of p to shareholders 
as well as private benefit, b, to the managers, hence the manager' s expected utility consists of a 
fraction, a, of the financial payoffs of the project, and the private benefit, ap + b. If the manager is 
the owner of the firm (a = 1), he jointly maximizes the financial payoff and the private benefit but 
if his equity share is zero (a = 0), he only maximizes the private benefit. There are two types of 
projects (i = 1, 2) and each project has a payoff X with probability pi and zero with probability (1– 
pi).  Project  2  (the  good  project)  has  a  higher  expected  financial  payoff  than  Project  1(the  bad 
project) hence p2X > p1X; the manager’s private benefit is zero in Project 2 and it is a positive 
number, B, in Project 1. Both projects require an initial investment (project size), F and the private 
benefit is proportional to the firm size (B = bAT), where b > 0
3. The manager chooses the type of 
project that maximizes his/her expected utility. All parties are risk neutral. Finally, we impose the 
condition (p2 – p1)X > B, which implies that Project 2 is the socially efficient project:  
 
2.1 Market Finance without Monitoring 
The manager raises funds from the market without being monitored. Suppose the firm borrows F, 
and promises to repay D, where the existing debt is assumed to be senior to the new debt
4. If the 
firm  cannot  meet  its  commitments,  the  lender  can  liquidate  the  tangible  collateral,  AC.  The 
                                                            
3 We follow Hoshi et al. (1993) by assuming that the private benefit is proportional to the size of project and the size of 
the project proportional to the size of the firm. For consistency, we also assume that the payoff when the project is 
successful is also proportional to the size of the project.  
4 This assumption implies that existing debt rather than new debt is paid off first in the case of default.    6
manager’s payoff from Project 1 is a[p1(X – D + AT – DE) + (1 – p1)(AT – AC)] + bAT  and the 
corresponding payoff from Project 2 is a[p2(X – D + AT – DE) + (1 – p2)(AT – AC)]. 
The manager will choose the socially efficient project provided that  
(1)  T E C bA D A D X p p ³ - + - - ) )( ( 1 2 a  
If debtholders believe the managers will choose Project 2, their zero profit condition implies: 
(2)  p2D +(1– p2 ) (AC – DE) = F(1+r) 
Here we have introduced a positive market interest rate, r, as the opportunity cost of funds. This is 
important  since  the  main  point  of  this  paper  is  the  interaction  between  monetary  policy  stance 
(measured  by  interest  rates)  and  firm-specific  characteristics  in  determining  access  to  external 
finance
5. Substituting (2) into (1) we find that the manager will have a proper incentive to choose 
the good project if and only if the following condition is satisfied: 
(3)  b
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Depending on the parameters, if (3) is satisfied the firm chooses the good project, borrows from the 
financial market and makes an efficient investment decision. If the incentive constraint (3) is not 
satisfied, the firm chooses the bad project and the new debtholders require a higher repayment, D1. 
The lender’s zero profit condition is  p1D1 +(1– p1 ) (AC – DE) = F(1+r). 
At this value of D1 the manager would choose the inefficient project (the bad project) and his 
payoff would be a[p1X + AT – DE – F(1+r)] + bAT. In a world without intermediary finance, if the 
incentive constraint (3) holds, the manager chooses the good project, and if it does not hold he/she 
chooses the bad project. In both cases, the manager borrows from the financial market.   
 
2.2. Intermediary Finance 
 In  this  section  we  introduce  a  new  group  of  investors  (banks)  endowed  with  a  monitoring 
technology that enables them to observe the manager’s project choice at a cost of m per project. 
Since the monitoring technology is costly for individual investors, the investors deposit their money 
                                                            
5 Hoshi et al. (1993) assumed that the opportunity cost of finance is zero (r=0), but this does not allow us to investigate 
the influence of monetary policy, which operates through changes in interest rates. This is especially appropriate in our 
case because we use UK data where the official interest rate is used by the Bank of England to conduct monetary policy 
with respect to its inflation target. The change in this instrument is a direct measure of the monetary policy stance.   7
in monitoring intermediary institutions, mainly banks
6. Now if the incentive constraint (3) is not 
satisfied,  the  manager  might  still  choose  the  good project by borrowing from banks. Then, the 
repayment of the loan, L, to the intermediary institution must satisfy p2L +(1– p2 )(AC – DE) = (F+ 
m)(1+r) .
7 In this case, the manager’s payoff is a[p2X + AT – DE – (F+m)(1+r)] and the manager 
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The firm issues public debt (borrows directly from the market) if either (3) holds or (4) does not 
hold, otherwise the firm borrows from intermediary institutions. The conditions for market finance 
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where the identity is implied by our restriction that X is proportional to the size of the project. 
Notice that p2X is a measure of profitability. AC/AT and DE/AT are the ratio of collateral assets to 
total assets and the firm’s gearing ratio, respectively. If we denote the lower critical point of the 
interval as Q1 and the upper critical point as Q2, those firms with profitability measures below Q1 
use public debt to finance their investments in bad projects, while those firms with corresponding 
values above Q2 use the same source to finance their investments in good projects. Firms with 
profitability  measures  between  Q1  and  Q2  use  bank  debt  to  finance  their  investments  in  good 
projects.  
                                                            
6 Both Diamond (1984) and Chant (1992) have shown that banks have greater incentives to monitor than individual 
investors. 
7 In this case, the repayment to a monitoring institution includes both the loan return and the monitoring cost.    8
The value of the critical points may depend upon the financial structure of firms and the 
financial environment where lending and borrowing activities take place. Where the firm’s financial 
structure  is  strong  (i.e.  characterized  by  high  value  of  total  assets and low gearing ratios, high 
probabilities of success of good projects, high manager’s shares of equity, low private benefits, 
monitoring cost and market interest rates, etc), the critical values would be low.  
   
3.  Model Predictions 
Our main goal in this paper is to determine the implications of changes in monetary policy on the 
financing options of firms, with a special interest in knowing how these effects vary with firm 
characteristics, such as size, collateral, debt and risk. Here we sign the partial derivatives of our 
model and, where possible, the cross-partials. 
 
3.1 Firm Characteristics 
 
Firm Size 
We measure firm size by the value of total assets, AT. From (7) we find that the lower (upper) 





























where the above derivation takes into account that F and X are assumed to be proportional to AT. 
Our model predicts that the range of bank finance is ceteris paribus increasing with firm size.  
 
Riskiness  
A relative change in the project success probabilities may be interpreted as variability in the risk 
distribution. Let us then denote the risk factor term (p2 – p1) by r > 0.  A relatively high value of r 
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The above imply that ceteris paribus a lower level of risk increases the number of firms that 
have access to low-cost market finance and the number of firms that can access bank finance.    9
Collateral Assets and Debt  
An increase in collateral assets relative to total assets causes the upper critical point to decline since 
AC enters the expression for Q2 with a negative sign. This implies that access to market finance 
increases with collateral. There is no corresponding effect on the lower critical value since collateral 
assets do not appear in Q1. Hence intermediary finance will decline independently of the shape of 
the distribution as a result of a rise in collateral assets. In addition, the magnitude of the change in 
the upper critical point would be larger for small firms than for large firms. This follows from the 
fact that a given increase in collateral assets would have a larger effect on small firms, which have 
lower total assets, than for large firms. As a result small firms are likely to be more sensitive to a 
change in collateral assets of a given size.   
Debt is an important determinant of the strength of the balance sheet for much the same 
reasons
8. The variable DE enters Q1 with a positive sign: indebted firms are more likely to finance 
their projects through intermediary finance, if at all.  Thus the impact of debt on the equilibrium 
condition is just the opposite of collateral assets: an increase in existing debt causes the upper 
critical point to increase. As in the case of collateral assets, the existing debt does not affect the 
lower critical point, and the magnitude of these effects is decreasing in firm size. 
    
Profitability  
It is clear from (7) that p2X/AT has a central role in the model. The numerator is equal to expected 
revenues while the denominator is equal to total assets, thus the ratio is a measure of the expected 
rate of return or profitability.
9 Our model predicts that firms fall into three groups according to their 
profitability, and controlling for other firm characteristics, this affects their  financial options. High-
profit firms finance their projects by borrowing directly from the capital market at a low interest 
rate. Firms with moderate profits do not have access to low interest financing in the capital market 
and borrow from banks. Finally, low-profit firms that cannot raise funds from banks must find 
alternative forms of finance, if available. This logic implies that there is a link between sources of 
finance  and  rate  or  return  or  profitability.  An  empirical  test  that  confirms  the  link  between 
profitability, as a proxy for p2X/AT, and forms of finance would offer some initial support of the 
theoretical framework
10.  
                                                            
8 The term (AC – DE)/AT  can be thought of as a measure of net worth. 
9  Hoshi  et  al.  (1993)  refer  to  this  term  as  Tobin’s  Q  because  they  use  the  Tobin’s  Q  measure  in  the  empirical 
implementation of their model. 
10 Empirical evidence among UK firms suggests that there is heterogeneity in the investment returns of firms when the 
distinction is drawn between financially constrained and unconstrained firms (see Basu and Guariglia, 2002).   10
 
3.2 Monetary Policy Implications 
We have introduced a market interest rate in the model as a measure of the opportunity cost of 
finance in order to examine the implications of monetary policy for the transmission mechanism. 
The traditional balance sheet channel indicates that higher interest rates result in higher servicing 
costs, lower retained profits and therefore weaker firm balance sheets (see Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1994;  and  Bernanke  and  Gertler,  1995,  Bernanke,  Gertler  and  Gilchrist,  1996).    We  therefore 
assume that the net worth ratio, (AC – DE)/AT , denoted w, is a decreasing function of the interest 
rate, ¶w(r)/¶ r < 0.  
The interest rate affects the upper and the lower critical points as follows: 
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This means that as interest rates decrease, firms that experience an increase in the ratio of market to 
intermediary finance should have higher rates of return compared to those firms that experience a 
decrease.
11 In addition, the above expressions suggest that, since net worth affects only the upper 
limit, the more sensitive the former is to interest rate changes, i.e. the higher is 
r ¶
¶w
, the greater the 
effect of a change in interest rates will be on the upper limit.  
Second  order  effects  can  be  evaluated  by  differentiating  the  derivatives 
r
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, with respect to risk, r = p2 − p1, and asset size, AT.   
 
Monetary Policy and Risk 
Access to intermediary finance when monetary policy is tight is very much related to the risk factor. 














                                                            
11  A  change  in  the  interest  rates  affects  both  upper  and  lower  critical  points  therefore  without  knowing  the  exact 
distribution we cannot make any claims about the changes in total market and total intermediary finance. Nevertheless, 
we know that firms around the lower critical point (Q1) are firms who have a low expected return from good project and 
firms around the upper critical point (Q2) are firms who have a high-expected return from good project. Therefore, after 
a decrease in the interest rates, firms around Q1 should substitute intermediary finance for high-cost market finance and 
firms around Q2 should substitute low-cost market finance for intermediary finance.   11
In other words, the extent of intermediary finance declines more for riskier firms as a result of a 
tighter monetary policy. As the risk factor increases, i.e. r declines, firms are also more likely to 
adopt socially inefficient projects. 
 
Monetary Policy and Asset size 













As firm size increases, the impact of rising interest rates on the composition of firm finance will be 
less significant. Smaller firms are more sensitive to the tightening of monetary policy and are more 
likely to switch from intermediary finance to other sources lower down the pecking order. 
 
 4. Data  
4.1. Data sources and definitions 
The  FAME  database  covers  all  UK  registered  companies  giving  up  to  11  years  of  detailed 
information (modified accounts) for about 500,000 large, small and medium sized UK companies. 
Large firms provide balance sheets, profit-loss accounts and some important ratios based on firms’ 
accounting  thresholds  (section  248  of  Companies  Act  1985).  Small  and  medium  enterprises 
(SMEs), have some advantages relative to large companies because they need not prepare detailed 
accounts. For medium-sized companies there is no requirement to disclose turnover details, while 
for small-sized companies only an abridged balance sheet is required. 
We construct a sample from the FAME Database that allows us some flexibility in analysing 
the monetary transmission mechanism and corporate sector finance. The sample is extracted on the 
following criteria
12: 
·  Firms whose primary activity is classified as manufacturing industry according to 1992 SIC 
UK Code in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
 13. 
·  Firms established prior to 1989 and still reporting for the years 1999 and 2000
14.     
                                                            
12 The sample result is based figures downloaded in October and November 2001. The sample size based on these 
criteria is likely to change with downloading time because of monthly revision of firm accounts. 
13  The  software  included  940  firms  (5.7  percent  of  total  sample)  whose  secondary  activity  is  classified  in  the 
manufacturing sector rather than the primary activity.   12
We now turn to our measure of the financial mix. Kashyap et al. (1993) defined the mix as the ratio 
of short-term bank loans to sum of short-term bank loans and commercial paper, while Oliner and 
Rudebush (1996) used the ratio of short-term debt to the sum of short-term debt and all forms of 
short term non-bank finance, not merely commercial paper. We derive three different measures of 
the financial mix that correspond to these measures – short-term debt to current liabilities; total debt 
to total liabilities; and short-term debt to total debt. Short-term debt is made up of the sum of bank 
overdrafts, short term-group and director loans, hire purchase, leasing and other short-term loans. 
Current liabilities are made of short-term debt, trade credit and total other current liabilities that 
include some forms of finance resembling commercial paper or bonds. Finally, the item of total 
liabilities is made of current liabilities, long term debt and other long-term liabilities.  
We also use a variety of firm characteristics, namely size; perceived riskiness (QuiScore); 
age; solvency; gearing; real asset size. The database contains quite rich information about firms on 
these characteristics. Size is based on the definitions adopted by the UK government’s Department 
of Trade and Industry, which defines small, medium and large companies on the basis that they 
satisfy two out of three criteria based on turnover, balance sheet and employees. The logarithm of 
real total assets is used to cover both the impact of size and activity level of firms on the form of 
finance, and is calculated by deflating nominal total assets by the relevant sectoral producer price 
index. 
Our  measure  of  risk  is  the  QuiScore  measure  produced  by  Qui  Credit  Assessment  Ltd, 
which  assesses  the  likelihood  of  company  failure  in  the  twelve  months  following  the  date  of 
calculation. The QuiScore is given as a number in the range 0 to 100, and for ease of interpretation, 
that range may be considered as comprising five distinct bands.
15 Clearly firms in bands one and 
two are quite secure, while firms in band four are four times as likely to fail as the firms in band 
three, and are therefore quite risky. Firms in band five are almost certain to fail unless action is 
taken immediately. Firms whose QuiScore figures are at most 40, were labeled risky firms while 
those have QuiScore over 60 were labeled secure firms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 In fact, only 3 percent of the firms in the manufacturing industry stopped reporting during the period of 1990-1999. 
This may stem from either failure of company or getting into the exemption threshold, which allows some missing 
observations in company’s accounts held on the FAME Database. These are prevalent in the first couple of years of the 
sample period, and this means that the sample is not a balanced panel, since firms whose turnover is under the threshold 
are not observed (the threshold on turnover is £90,000).  
15 The QuiScore is based on statistical analysis of a random selection of companies. To ensure that the model is not 
distorted, three categories are screened out from the initial selection: major public companies, companies that have 
insignificant amounts of unsecured trade credit and liquidated companies that have a surplus of assets over liabilities. 
There are five bands, i.e. secure band (81-100), stable band (61-80), normal band (41-60), unstable band (21-40) and 
high risk band (0-20). .   13
There are four other measures of firm-specific characteristics that we employ. We have 
information about the year of incorporation for all firms. We introduce the age as an explanatory 
variable and classify firms by their age to measure the importance of track record for the change in 
the composition of firm external finance. Firms that were incorporated before 1975 are called ‘old’ 
while those incorporated between 1975-1989 are called ‘young’ firms. We use the solvency ratio 
(the ratio of shareholders’ equity to total asset) and the gearing ratio (the ratio of total loans to 
shareholder funds) as indicators of financial healthiness of firms. We classified firms as ‘highly-
indebted’ or ‘low-indebted’ if their gearing figures are in the highest or lowest quartile of the 
distribution, respectively. Low capital return and high capital return indicate the lowest and highest 
25% expected returns (by value), respectively, and are measures of expected profitability. The latter 
are more likely to be financially constrained than the former. 
In Kashyap et al. (1993) monetary policy stance was measured with reference to Romer 
dates (Romer and Romer 1990), the Federal Funds rate and the spread of the Federal Funds rate 
over Treasury bonds. There are no equivalents to Romer dates in the UK, but we can use the official 
interest rate to measure monetary policy tightness. We could make use of the level of interest rate to 
measure monetary policy or the cumulated change in each year. The former starts from some 
historically determined level and reports the effects of rate changes on the level, while the latter 
simply calculates the successive changes (either positive or negative) from the beginning of each 
year. The marginal effect in each case is the same
16.  
 
4.2 Empirical Methodology  
Our sample offers a natural experiment to evaluate the influence of firm-specific characteristics on 
the response of the corporate financial mix to monetary policy. The first period of our sample, 
1990-1992,  relates  to  the  period  when  monetary  policy  in  the  UK  was  dedicated  towards 
maintaining the exchange rate within its target zone in the Exchange Rate Mechanism. The period 
coincided with a recession, tightening monetary policy and a harsh environment for existing and 
new corporate borrowers. This was because high rates of interest in Germany after reunification and 
the perceived weakness of sterling as a currency contributed to keep UK interest rates high during 
this period in order to meet the external policy objective. The second period following the recession, 
                                                            
16 A shortcoming of either the level or the cumulative change is that they are firm-invariant i.e. there is a single base rate 
level (or change) for all firms having different characteristics for a given year As a result the variable can appear 
significant because it is capturing an event that is specific to a given year or an event that affects all firms as a group. To 
overcome this problem in this study we make use of time dummies and firm specific fixed effects in a panel data 
framework to condition for year and firm-specific fixed effects.    14
1993-1999, witnessed a period of sustained economic growth, falling unemployment and inflation, 
and interest rates at historically low levels. The corporate sector experienced an improvement in net 
worth  and  borrowing  conditions  were  less  constrained.  Thus  we  have  two  successive  episodes 
where the climate for corporate borrowing would have been very different: the climate is likely to 
affect the financial ‘mix’ between market-based and bank-based finance.    
The composition of external finance (the mix) is regressed on the variables derived from the 
model explained above. In this context the model employed is:  
MIX =f(MPS, MPRp, FCDj, MPS*FCDj ,MPS*MPRp, FCDj*MPRp, MPS*FCDj*MPRp, RASSET, 
SCORE,  AGE,  SOLV,  COL, GEAR,  GDP, YEARD) 
We measure the mix as the ratio of total short-term debt to total current liabilities, MIX1,  the ratio 
of total debt to total liabilities, MIX2, and the ratio of short-term debt to total debt, MIX3.
17 The 
explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
MPS denotes the monetary policy stance i.e. the cumulative changes to the official (base) 
interest rate (BRATE). Two-time period dummies are assigned to reflect the tight monetary policy 
period of 1990-1992 (TP) and the loose monetary policy period of 1993-1999 (LP), respectively. 
  MPRp = 1  if  p= TP, LP 
          = 0   otherwise 
We  then  define  dummies  for  firm-specific  characteristics.  FCD  consists  of  ten  different 
binary variables (j = 1 ….10) reflecting ten different firm characteristics i.e. small, large, risky, 
secure, young, old, highly indebted, low indebted, high profitable and low profitable, respectively.  
  FCDj = 1    j = 1 ….10  
          = 0  otherwise 
Having introduced these period and firm group dummies we can interact them with the 
monetary stance variable. These additions allow us to test for differences in the reaction of the mix 
to  monetary  policy  changes  across  groups  and  sub-periods.  The  interaction  of  monetary  stance 
variable  with  firm  characteristics  group  is  denoted,  MPS*FCD,  the  corresponding  one  for  sub-
                                                            
17We provide summaries of the results for MIX2 and MIX3, but full results are available from the authors upon request. 
These results are supportive of the model.   15
periods is denoted, MPS*MPR, and the one that includes both firms characteristics and sub-periods, 
MPS*FCD*MPR
18.  
The remaining variables are control variables. RASSET
19 is the logarithm of nominal value 
total assets for each firm deflated by two digits SIC producer price indices. SCORE is the credit 
rating as explained above by the QuiScore. AGE shows the age of firms. SOLV and GEAR are the 
solvency ratio and the gearing ratio. COL is the ratio of tangible assets to total asset that proxies the 
collateral level of the firms and thus the extent of moral hazard. GDP is the growth rate of gross 
domestic product that is invariant across firms to control for the business cycle and YEARD are time 
(year) dummies to control for unobserved time effects. We report basic statistics for the variables 
used in the regressions across sub-periods in Table 1a and across firm characteristics in Table 1b. 
We  estimate  the  relationship  between  the  financial  choices  of  firms  and  their  specific 
characteristics  using  a  standard  panel  model  that  enables  us  to  control  for  firm  specific 
unobservable effects and to account for firm heterogeneity. The format is: 
yit = ai + Xitb + eit  
where i = 1,2,…., N refers to a cross section unit (firms in this study), t = 1,2,…..,T refers to time 
period.  yit    and  Xit    denote  the  dependent  variable  and  the  vector  of  non-stochastic  explanatory 
variables for firm i and year t, respectively. eit is the error term, and ai  captures firm-specific 
effects. When we compared a random effects model against a fixed effects alternative, we rejected 
the hypothesis of no systematic difference between coefficients obtained from the random effects 
and fixed effects models by using the Hausman test. Therefore, we report the fixed effects estimates 




We begin by evaluating the response of the financial mix to the firm-specific characteristics and 
other control variables in our panel estimates. As this is relatively straightforward and confirms our 
                                                            
18 Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) employ a similar methodology.  
19 Since there is a significant number of missing observations in intangible assets, we calculate total assets excluding 
intangible assets. 
20 Estimates based on an IV estimator – which are robust to the endogeneity bias – suggested that the results are almost 
identical to those reported here. Therefore we conclude that the extent of the endogeneity bias is very small. However, 
we also estimated a dynamic panel GMM-estimator such as that proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The hypothesis 
of no serial autocorrelation of residuals was not rejected for the second order Arellano-Bond test, while the Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions, through which the null hypothesis of the validity of the GMM instruments can be tested, 
was rejected for different versions of the model. Therefore we did not report the results. While our model is robust to 
firm-specific  heterogeneity,  since  we  account  for  these  factors  explicitly  in  our  model,  we  may  still  encounter 
endogeneity bias when we introduce dynamic aspects.     16
priors, we move on briskly to the more policy-relevant issue of how the impact of monetary policy 
varies with the financial characteristics of the firm.   
  
5.1 Response to control variables 
Comparing the columns in each of the panels of Table 2 allows us to evaluate the response of firms 
with specific characteristics in comparison to the response of the whole panel, which is reported in 
the  first  column.  We  investigate  the  specific  influence  of  factors  such  as  asset  size,  risk,  age, 
solvency, collateral assets, gearing, GDP growth rate and time dummies on the mix.  
Taking the logarithm of real assets size first, it provides an indicator of the extent of firm 
activity, and this is found to be an important determinant of the mix. We expect to find that the 
firms with greater assets have greater access to intermediary finance. Clearly beyond some point 
they would be eligible for market finance at more favorable interest rates, but our theoretical model 
predicts that the net effect of an increase in asset size will result in a greater proportion of firms that 
cross the lower than the upper thresholds. Hence we expect the mix to increase with size, and this is 
what we find. We uniformly observe positive signs, implying that a greater share of intermediary 
finance is taken up in response to an increase in real assets.   
The  model  also  predicts  that  as  risk  falls  so  the  firms  accessing  both  intermediary  and 
market finance increase. Our measure of the risk is the QuiScore rating (SCORE), and the higher the 
value the less risky the firm; we expect both bank-based and market based finance to increase with 
an increase in the SCORE, but the response of the mix is ambiguous.  Our results indicate that the 
mix falls with an increase in the SCORE, which suggests that as firms become safer overall in terms 
of their credit rating, more of them exit intermediary finance than take it up.   
Age appears to be a significant explanatory variable for some measures of the mix and its 
coefficients are positive in all regressions
21.  Age provides a confirmation of the importance of a 
track record for certain types of firms and this is a direct test of the relationship-banking proposition 
suggested by Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and Boot (2000). Small and financially weak firms, that 
nonetheless have a track record are less likely to be financially constrained because they have a 
better chance to receive bank finance. 
Firm  solvency  appears to be another important determinant of the mix as is gearing. In 
almost  all  the  regressions  the  coefficients  of  the  firm  solvency  are  significantly  positive,  as 
expected. This result provides support for the financial accelerator theory proposed by Kiyotaki and 
                                                            
21 Implication on AGE is not observed directly from theoretical model given above but AGE is a variable reflecting the 
track record discussed by Diamond (1991) that is a version of our model.   17
Moore (1997) where financially weak firms are more likely subject to constraints. The positive and 
significant  coefficients for gearing in almost all regressions is consistent with the prediction of 
Hoshi et al. (1993) that intermediary finance rises with gearing.
22 
The measure of collateral assets (tangible assets in total), COL, is less important in practice 
than expected. Greater collateral should enhance access to both intermediary and market finance, 
and depending on the relative inflows and outflows should alter the mix; but the variable does not 
appear to be significant in most of the regressions. There are several possible reasons for this. The 
net outflows (to market finance) and inflows (of firms previously unable to obtain any finance) 
could leave the mix, which is a ratio, almost unchanged. Thus the variable may appear insignificant 
even though it is in fact important. Alternatively, the effects of tangible assets in aggregate may 
have little additional explanatory power over the effect of total real assets, which we have already 
identified as a significant influence on the mix.   
Comparing the responses of the top 25% with the bottom 25% of firms according to their 
capital returns, we find that there was little evidence of significant differences in the response to the 
measures of the financial mix in tight or benign periods, with the exception of the ratio of short-
term debt to total debt. Here the response indicates that the firms expected to be most profitable 
were inclined to shift out of short term debt as interest rates increased, which is consistent with our 
prediction that more profitable firms will have greater access to longer term market finance.  
Finally,  we  use  GDP  growth  rate  to  control  for  cyclical  effects  in  aggregate  level.  An 
increase in the GDP growth rate encourages firms to shift toward to non-debt liabilities. There are 
significant time effects from dummies for 1992 (positive, suggesting a shift towards greater debt 
and less market finance) and 1995, 1996 and 1999 (all negative). The inclusion of this variable in all 
panel estimates controls for demand-side influences. 
5.2 Monetary Policy, Firm Characteristics and the Financial Mix  
We  report  the  detailed  findings  of  fixed  effects  estimates  for  MIX1  in  Table  2,  and  the 
corresponding  results  for  MIX2  and  MIX3  (unreported,  available  on  request)  are  similar,  but 
summaries of the responses to monetary policy are reported later, in Table 3. There are three panels 
of estimations in Table 2 labeled a-c, which partition the results into estimations for the whole 
period (1990-1999), the tight period (1990-92) and the benign period (1993-99). The rows separate 
                                                            
22 We have classified firms according to gearing in order to measure the impact of monetary policy on the composition 
of external finance across low and highly indebted firms. It is estimated that the mix of firms in the high-debt group is 
more  sensitive  to  change  in  monetary  policy  stance  than  that  of  the  low-debt  firms.  It  may  be  the  case  that  high   18
out the responses of firms according to type based on: size – small versus large firms; credit rating – 
risky  and  secure  firms;  age  –  young  and  old  firms;  high  and  low  indebted.  We  reported  the 
estimation results with interaction terms that allow us to test the reactions of the financial mix to 
changes in the monetary policy regime i.e. whole sample, tight and loose periods (three panels). 
Estimation results without using any interaction term that includes firm characteristics are reported 
in column 2 in each Table. We separate out the responses of firms according to size – small, large 
firms in columns 3-4, credit rating – risky and secure firms in columns 5-6, age – young and old 
firms in columns 7-8, gearing – highly and low indebted firms in columns 9-10. We do not report 
the  results  for  profitability  since  the  findings  for  this  group  of  firms  do  not  contain  any  new 
information.  
The  coefficients  of  the  measure  of  monetary  policy  stance  (row  1)  are  negative  and 
significant. This result confirms the proposition that changing monetary policy stance reduces the 
liability composition of non-financial firms. But the variable is invariant for firms of different types 
and  to  avoid  drawing  the  (incorrect)  conclusion  that  our  monetary  policy  variable  is  important 
because it acts as a proxy for some other time-specific effect, we introduce interactive dummies.  
First, we multiply the monetary policy stance variable by sub-period dummies reflecting the 
monetary policy regime. In this way we can report the results in Tables 2b and 2c for the tight and 
loose monetary policy periods. The resulting coefficient estimates verify the constraining impact of 
tight  monetary  policy  on  the  access  of  firms  of  all  types  to  bank  loans  (the  coefficient  on  the 
monetary policy variable is negative and significant in the tight period and positive and significant 
in the loose period). The constraining mechanism may work through the supply of bank loans or 
through  the  demand  side,  although  we  have  already  conditioned  for  GDP  growth  to  remove 
demand-side influences. The interaction between TP and monetary policy should therefore capture 
the influence of the supply-side as loan supply tightens, providing evidence that a bank-lending 
channel operates on all types of firms not just small firms, as suggested by Kashyap et al. (1993). It 
also confirms the theoretical predictions made by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Kashyap et al. 
(1993) that tight monetary policy constrains loan supply. In fact, there is substantial evidence for a 
bank-lending channel, and it is not independent of firm-specific characteristics
23. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
indebtedness is perceived as a weakness during tight periods because the higher interest rate reduces the cash flow of 
firms and this increases the debt-servicing burden. 
23 A scientifically rigorous and open-minded study by Fisher (1999) concludes that for his particular specification of a 
quantitative  general  equilibrium  model  the  parameter  values  consistent  with  a  lending  view  are  ‘implausible’.  The 
concluding discussion presents several reasons why, in comparison with other recent research, these results may have 
been obtained from simulations. These reasons relate to the role of price stickiness in the transmission mechanism in 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), for example, and the approach to modeling credit market imperfections in papers that are   19
Second, we create a binary variable for each firm-specific characteristic, FCDj and interact 
this dummy with the monetary stance variable, MPS*FCDj. The overall impact of a change in the 
monetary policy stance variable on the liability composition of firm group may be calculated by 
adding  the  coefficient  of  respective  interaction  terms  (reported  in  row  2  of  Table  2a)  to  the 
coefficients of MPS. Terms for small, risky, young and highly indebted firms that are subject to 
supply constraints are negative and larger in absolute terms than for large, secure, old and low 
indebted firms. This implies that there is a greater response in the mix variable for smaller, more 
risky,  younger  and  highly  indebted  firms  when  monetary  policy  tightens.  The  coefficients  of 
interaction terms for large, secure, and old firms are positive and significant, which may imply that 
these firms were not confronted with short-term bank finance constraints when monetary policy was 
tightened. Small, young and risky firms were more likely to be financially constrained and were 
more reliant on bank finance, thus their financial positions were much more significantly affected 
by a change in monetary policy regime. The sign and significance of firm characteristic dummies 
indicates a shift in the mix for firms of specific types.  
In Tables 2b and 2c we can see the effects of interacting the tight period and loose dummies 
with the firm characteristics dummies and the monetary stance variable. Small, risky, young, and 
highly indebted firms experienced a greater decline in the mix than did the large, secure, old, and 
low indebted firms. This is consistent with the traditional credit channel story, but it identifies the 
specific characteristics of firms that are subject to constraints on bank finance. It is confirmed by the 
reversal of signs for financially healthy firms, which are generally larger, older and more secure. 
For the loose monetary policy period, the impact of monetary policy on MIX1 is positive for small, 
risky, and young firms, while it is negative for large, secure, and old firms. It appears that small, 
young and risky firms are more likely to get bank loans during the loose period, increasing the mix 
variable, while those firms that are financially strong (large, secure, old, low indebted) were able to 
assess cheaper market finance in this period. All these results confirm the properties of the model. 
Table 3 provides a summary of the magnitudes, signs and significance of the results for the 
other mix variables, MIX2 and MIX3, in comparison to MIX1. We omit the details of the responses 
to  the  control  variables  although  they  are  very  similar  to  the  results  for  MIX1,  in  order  to 
concentrate on the responses to the monetary policy variable and the interaction terms. Here we see 
that all the mix measures respond in a similar fashion during tight and loose monetary regimes; 
despite the differences in magnitude, all the coefficients have common signs and significance.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
more supportive of the lending view compared to Fisher’s paper.  Subsequent work by Kishan and Opiela (2000) on the 
behavior of banks (as opposed to firms) confirms evidence in favor of the lending view.        20
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) criticize Kashyap et  al. (1993), who find support for the bank 
lending channel from aggregate data, by claiming that the decline in their mix measure is more 
likely to originate from shifting bank loans between small and large firms, and not necessarily from 
a decline in the supply of bank funds. We observe that the empirical evidence supports Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1996) to some extent, since we confirm a shift in bank loans from small to large firms 
in the tight monetary regime, but this result does not undermine the evidence for the bank lending 
channel. The coefficients for monetary stance are generally negative across all firm groups during 
tight periods, and crucially for the interchange between Kashyap et al. (1993, 1996) and Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1996), we find similar responses irrespective of the choice of mix measures used to 
represent firms’ responses to monetary policy. We conclude that there is substantial evidence for 
different reactions to monetary policy through the influence of the credit channel and these depend 
heavily on firm-specific characteristics.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has re-examined the evidence for credit channels on the composition of corporate finance 
during tight and loose periods of monetary policy. The paper has extended a theoretical framework, 
based on Diamond (1991) and Hoshi et al. (1993), in which to analyse the effects of monetary 
policy  and  firm-specific  characteristics.  This  model  makes  predictions  about  the  response  in 
financial structure to firm-specific characteristics and monetary policy conditions. Using firm level 
data for 16,000 firms over a decade allows us to test the predictions based on size, credit rating, age 
and indebtedness to determine whether monetary policy tightening influences the mix between types 
of short-term and long-term finance.  
The results show that smaller, more risky or highly indebted and younger firms are more 
noticeably affected by monetary tightening than larger, secure, less-indebted or older firms. This 
confirms the findings of major US studies relating to the credit channel, and suggests that these 
features are also present in UK data.  Specifically, there is a broad credit channel effect (Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1996), a bank-lending channel  (Kashyap et al. 1993 and Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), 
accelerator effects (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, and Bernanke et al., 1999), evidence consistent with 
relationship banking when age proxies for the development of such bank-firm relationships (Rajan, 
1992, Berlin and Mester, 1999 and Boot, 2000), and an influence from debt gearing (Hoshi et al., 
1993).    21
The effect of the tightening of monetary policy is felt more severely by small and medium 
sized firms and by those that have adverse financial characteristics such as poor solvency, a short 
track  record,  high  gearing  and  low  real  assets  compared  to  the  large,  financially  healthy,  long-
established  companies  with  good  credit  ratings.  Larger  companies  are  least  affected  in  the 
composition of their financial structure by a changing monetary climate. We conclude that Oliner 
and Rudebusch (1996) were right to point out the importance of distinguishing between firm types, 
but in the UK, the effects of making this distinction do not undermine the findings of Kashyap et al. 
(1993) as they did in the US.  Our investigation has uncovered new dimensions to the influence of 
firm-specific  characteristics,  besides  size,  on  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  through  the  credit 
channel.   
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Table 1a. Basic Statistics across Periods               
                       
  MIX1  SCORE  RASSET  AGE  SOLV  COL  GEAR  BRATE  GDP 
Whole Period, 1990-1990 
Obs  144838  143133  145191  145246  143983  140927  128774  145246  145246 
Mean  29.26  58.84  8.38  30.56  39.83  0.31  183.94  41.05  2.26 
Std. Dev.  27.12  22.05  1.65  23.81  27.05  0.20  562.84  23.47  1.60 
Tight Period, 1990-1992 
Obs  35860  35309  35906  35919  35630  35140  31853  35919  35919 
Mean  28.21  56.96  8.39  29.10  38.29  0.32  197.87  76.35  -0.20 
Std. Dev.  26.84  22.22  1.66  24.26  26.57  0.20  608.81  15.81  0.90 
Loose Period, 1993-1999 
Obs  108978  107824  109285  109327  108353  105787  96921  109327  109327 
Mean  29.61  59.46  8.37  31.03  40.34  0.31  179.36  29.45  3.06 
Std. Dev.  27.20  21.96  1.64  23.64  27.19  0.20  546.82  10.30  0.72 
 
Table 1b. Basic Statistics across Firm Characteristics           
   
  MIX1  SCORE  RASSET  AGE  SOLV  COL  GEAR 
Small Firms 
Obs  30525  29841  30635  30643  30003  29740  25098 
Mean  27.88  57.05  6.80  23.34  37.24  0.28  200.74 
Std. Dev.  27.70  23.55  0.90  18.93  30.66  0.21  629.14 
Large Firms 
Obs  42780  42371  42813  42815  42656  42066  40120 
Mean  34.31  58.59  10.26  38.42  37.72  0.32  211.25 
Std. Dev.  26.40  21.36  1.32  27.48  24.54  0.19  598.29 
Risky Firms 
Obs  30792  31080  31037  31080  30602  29986  24382 
Mean  43.92  29.62  8.19  24.96  12.85  0.28  529.64 
Std. Dev.  28.59  9.40  1.65  21.03  22.20  0.20  1007.16 
Secure Firms 
Obs  66337  64241  66343  66354  65645  63962  58623 
Mean  20.96  79.36  8.45  34.31  57.74  0.32  54.01 
Std. Dev.  24.77  11.28  1.66  24.96  22.72  0.20  230.48 
Young Firms 
Obs  62356  61171  62485  62517  61630  60587  54051 
Mean  29.41  54.94  7.98  11.70  34.03  0.30  208.79 
Std. Dev.  27.51  21.74  1.50  4.69  27.06  0.20  594.95 
Old Firms 
Obs  82482  81962  82706  82729  82353  80340  74723 
Mean  29.15  61.75  8.68  44.80  44.18  0.32  165.97 
Std. Dev.  26.81  21.82  1.68  22.52  26.22  0.20  537.72 
Highly Indebted Firms 
Obs  48288  46632  48612  48661  47398  46159  32189 
Mean  40.62  44.38  8.30  27.08  19.00  0.29  601.12 
Std. Dev.  30.77  21.48  1.79  22.47  29.80  0.21  1015.29 
Low Indebted Firms 
Obs  32163  32122  32181  32181  32181  31362  32181 
Mean  9.00  77.75  8.15  34.27  64.69  0.27  6.78 
Std. Dev.  16.44  16.84  1.38  24.24  17.73  0.18  5.07 
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Table 2a. The Base Rates Interacted with Firm Characteristics: Dependent Variable: MIX1 
 
  Whole  Small  Large  Risky  Secure  Young  Old  HIndebted  LIndebted 
BRATE  -0.025***  -0.014***  -0.043***  -0.024***  -0.031***  -0.015***  -0.045***  -0.022***  -0.016*** 
  (5.35)  (2.96)  (8.81)  (5.05)  (6.38)  (3.15)  (8.40)  (4.74)  (3.56) 
BRATE*FCD    -0.072***  0.047***  -0.005  0.015***  -0.030***  0.030***  -0.000  0.001 
    (14.71)  (11.53)  (1.08)  (3.97)  (7.56)  (7.56)  (0.00)  (0.32) 
FCD    8.266***  -4.973***  1.773***  -0.750***  0.000  0.000  13.696***  -20.160*** 
    (28.48)  (16.70)  (6.48)  (3.08)  (.)  (.)  (54.00)  (85.62) 
RASSET  3.997***  4.863***  4.433***  3.990***  3.993***  3.893***  3.893***  3.702***  3.431*** 
  (27.47)  (32.64)  (29.46)  (27.43)  (27.43)  (26.64)  (26.64)  (26.15)  (25.25) 
SCORE  -0.618***  -0.618***  -0.618***  -0.595***  -0.616***  -0.617***  -0.617***  -0.603***  -0.602*** 
  (121.64)  (122.19)  (121.80)  (104.41)  (100.56)  (121.62)  (121.62)  (122.00)  (126.98) 
AGE  0.843***  0.872***  0.867***  0.840***  0.842***  0.865***  0.865***  0.748***  0.731*** 
  (27.27)  (28.32)  (28.06)  (27.19)  (27.24)  (27.86)  (27.86)  (24.88)  (25.34) 
SOLV  0.186***  0.185***  0.183***  0.184***  0.187***  0.184***  0.184***  0.370***  0.414*** 
  (30.17)  (30.12)  (29.64)  (29.77)  (30.30)  (29.77)  (29.77)  (57.59)  (68.66) 
COL  0.902  1.079*  0.861  1.061*  0.912*  0.938*  0.938*  -0.517  -5.491*** 
  (1.63)  (1.96)  (1.56)  (1.92)  (1.65)  (1.70)  (1.70)  (0.96)  (10.58) 
GEAR  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.002***  0.004*** 
  (28.55)  (27.81)  (28.20)  (27.50)  (28.55)  (28.55)  (28.55)  (20.64)  (40.78) 
GDP  -0.726***  -0.759***  -0.769***  -0.720***  -0.725***  -0.753***  -0.753***  -0.643***  -0.594*** 
  (11.66)  (12.21)  (12.34)  (11.56)  (11.64)  (12.07)  (12.07)  (10.61)  (10.22) 
year92  1.044***  0.995***  1.042***  1.040***  1.047***  1.071***  1.071***  0.913***  0.805*** 
  (5.84)  (5.59)  (5.84)  (5.82)  (5.86)  (5.99)  (5.99)  (5.25)  (4.83) 
year93  0.168  0.063  0.099  0.174  0.168  0.148  0.148  0.182  0.189 
  (0.84)  (0.32)  (0.50)  (0.87)  (0.84)  (0.74)  (0.74)  (0.94)  (1.01) 
year95  -0.516***  -0.448***  -0.484***  -0.505***  -0.516***  -0.509***  -0.509***  -0.408***  -0.516*** 
  (3.36)  (2.92)  (3.15)  (3.28)  (3.35)  (3.31)  (3.31)  (2.73)  (3.60) 
year96  -1.054***  -0.992***  -1.071***  -1.034***  -1.044***  -1.106***  -1.106***  -0.798***  -0.903*** 
  (5.89)  (5.57)  (5.99)  (5.78)  (5.83)  (6.18)  (6.18)  (4.59)  (5.41) 
year97  -0.119  -0.062  -0.092  -0.111  -0.112  -0.125  -0.125  0.039  -0.106 
  (0.72)  (0.38)  (0.56)  (0.67)  (0.68)  (0.76)  (0.76)  (0.25)  (0.69) 
year99  -1.370***  -1.536***  -1.496***  -1.379***  -1.344***  -1.490***  -1.490***  -1.311***  -1.085*** 
  (5.87)  (6.60)  (6.41)  (5.91)  (5.76)  (6.37)  (6.37)  (5.77)  (4.98) 
Constant  -0.220  -9.826***  -2.675*  -1.710  0.048  0.215  0.215  -6.431***  3.837*** 
  (0.16)  (6.78)  (1.86)  (1.20)  (0.03)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (4.68)  (2.91) 
R-squared  0.19  0.20  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.23  0.29 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses,  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, N.of observations (firms): 125 832 (15 555)       25
Table 2b. The Base Rates Interacted with Firm Characteristics and Tight Period: Dependent Variable: MIX1 
 
  Whole  Small  Large  Risky  Secure  Young  Old  HIndebted  LIndebted 
BRATE  0.016**  -0.010**  -0.053***  -0.026***  -0.032***  -0.017***  -0.046***  -0.036***  -0.006 
  (2.54)  (2.02)  (10.62)  (5.37)  (6.18)  (3.43)  (7.69)  (7.58)  (1.19) 
BRATE*FCD*TP  -0.050***  -0.211***  0.157***  0.008  0.028**  -0.045***  0.045***  0.053***  -0.046*** 
  (5.87)  (15.08)  (13.37)  (0.55)  (2.47)  (3.90)  (3.90)  (4.09)  (3.57) 
FCD*TP  0.000  15.846***  -10.770***  -0.150  -1.272  1.559*  -1.559*  2.216**  -6.208*** 
  (.)  (14.78)  (11.56)  (0.14)  (1.44)  (1.74)  (1.74)  (2.21)  (6.13) 
RASSET  3.997***  3.985***  3.921***  3.997***  3.996***  3.827***  3.827***  4.007***  3.922*** 
  (27.47)  (27.20)  (26.84)  (27.46)  (27.46)  (26.08)  (26.08)  (27.62)  (27.17) 
SCORE  -0.618***  -0.619***  -0.619***  -0.615***  -0.623***  -0.617***  -0.617***  -0.611***  -0.606*** 
  (121.64)  (121.92)  (121.97)  (117.85)  (119.37)  (121.57)  (121.57)  (120.57)  (120.22) 
AGE  0.500***  0.794***  0.951***  0.850***  0.887***  0.790***  0.985***  0.950***  0.631*** 
  (9.70)  (25.50)  (29.80)  (27.18)  (27.47)  (25.09)  (28.29)  (30.40)  (20.18) 
SOLV  0.186***  0.187***  0.186***  0.185***  0.187***  0.182***  0.182***  0.204***  0.205*** 
  (30.17)  (30.35)  (30.16)  (30.01)  (30.30)  (29.47)  (29.47)  (32.96)  (33.40) 
COL  0.902  0.921*  0.908  0.917*  0.885  0.944*  0.944*  0.858  0.151 
  (1.63)  (1.67)  (1.64)  (1.66)  (1.60)  (1.71)  (1.71)  (1.56)  (0.27) 
GEAR  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003*** 
  (28.55)  (28.47)  (28.45)  (28.44)  (28.51)  (28.53)  (28.53)  (26.53)  (29.19) 
GDP  -0.786***  -0.568***  -1.001***  -0.724***  -0.754***  -0.734***  -0.806***  -0.642***  -0.832*** 
  (11.46)  (8.95)  (15.15)  (11.33)  (11.21)  (11.29)  (10.80)  (10.02)  (12.97) 
year92  1.302***  0.190  1.693***  1.046***  1.143***  0.989***  1.207***  0.769***  1.432*** 
  (7.53)  (1.01)  (9.00)  (5.60)  (5.81)  (5.03)  (5.62)  (4.09)  (7.74) 
year93  -0.605**  0.348*  -0.113  0.187  0.202  0.026  0.279  0.548***  -0.411** 
  (2.24)  (1.74)  (0.56)  (0.93)  (1.00)  (0.13)  (1.34)  (2.74)  (2.06) 
year95  -1.174***  -0.523***  -0.474***  -0.498***  -0.459***  -0.642***  -0.324**  -0.215  -0.902*** 
  (5.47)  (3.40)  (3.07)  (3.23)  (2.97)  (4.16)  (2.08)  (1.40)  (5.90) 
year96  -0.942***  -0.801***  -1.502***  -1.056***  -1.117***  -1.031***  -1.245***  -0.995***  -1.075*** 
  (5.55)  (4.46)  (8.25)  (5.86)  (6.11)  (5.70)  (6.56)  (5.53)  (5.99) 
year97  -0.044  -0.106  -0.144  -0.122  -0.127  -0.105  -0.149  -0.139  -0.069 
  (0.27)  (0.64)  (0.88)  (0.74)  (0.77)  (0.64)  (0.91)  (0.85)  (0.42) 
year99  0.000  -0.845***  -2.362***  -1.400***  -1.612***  -1.102***  -2.091***  -1.751***  -0.733*** 
  (.)  (3.59)  (9.71)  (5.90)  (6.56)  (4.60)  (7.82)  (7.37)  (3.09) 
Constant  9.810***  0.417  -1.057  -0.547  -1.051  2.821*  -2.307  -4.841***  5.815*** 
  (4.97)  (0.29)  (0.75)  (0.38)  (0.74)  (1.95)  (1.62)  (3.42)  (4.14) 
R-squared  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.20 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses,  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, N.of observations (firms): 125 832 (15 555)       26
Table 2c. Base Rates Interacted with Firm Characteristics and Loose Period: Dependent Variable: MIX1 
 
  Whole  Small  Large  Risky  Secure  Young  Old  HIndebted  LIndebted 
BRATE  -0.034***  -0.025***  -0.029***  -0.025***  -0.023***  -0.026***  -0.027***  -0.015***  -0.035*** 
  (6.17)  (5.26)  (6.09)  (5.27)  (4.71)  (5.48)  (5.27)  (3.18)  (7.78) 
BRATE*FCD*LP  0.050***  0.032**  -0.018*  0.017  -0.019*  0.026***  -0.026***  0.023**  -0.041*** 
  (5.87)  (2.52)  (1.74)  (1.32)  (1.90)  (2.68)  (2.68)  (2.02)  (3.71) 
FCD*LP  0.000  4.232***  -2.075***  0.903**  -0.067  1.086***  -1.086***  9.112***  -13.631*** 
  (.)  (10.33)  (5.80)  (2.15)  (0.20)  (3.07)  (3.07)  (24.47)  (38.08) 
RASSET  3.997***  4.529***  4.229***  3.990***  3.979***  3.811***  3.811***  3.763***  3.681*** 
  (27.47)  (30.91)  (28.89)  (27.42)  (27.33)  (25.94)  (25.94)  (26.22)  (26.23) 
SCORE  -0.618***  -0.620***  -0.618***  -0.604***  -0.610***  -0.617***  -0.617***  -0.618***  -0.623*** 
  (121.64)  (122.38)  (121.89)  (112.50)  (111.29)  (121.52)  (121.52)  (123.39)  (127.32) 
AGE  0.500***  0.780***  0.951***  0.808***  0.907***  0.757***  1.012***  0.606***  1.108*** 
  (9.70)  (23.93)  (27.05)  (24.67)  (23.58)  (20.62)  (24.02)  (18.22)  (33.97) 
SOLV  0.186***  0.184***  0.183***  0.186***  0.187***  0.182***  0.182***  0.290***  0.325*** 
  (30.17)  (30.02)  (29.66)  (30.16)  (30.35)  (29.41)  (29.41)  (45.70)  (52.97) 
COL  0.902  1.002*  0.855  0.988*  0.916*  0.926*  0.926*  -0.047  -2.673*** 
  (1.63)  (1.82)  (1.55)  (1.78)  (1.65)  (1.67)  (1.67)  (0.09)  (5.00) 
GEAR  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.004*** 
  (28.55)  (27.98)  (28.25)  (27.95)  (28.76)  (28.54)  (28.54)  (26.20)  (36.28) 
GDP  -0.786***  -0.844***  -0.698***  -0.746***  -0.715***  -0.785***  -0.666***  -0.889***  -0.389*** 
  (11.46)  (13.53)  (11.19)  (11.96)  (11.39)  (12.45)  (10.54)  (14.44)  (6.46) 
year92  1.302***  1.351***  0.854***  1.120***  0.999***  1.254***  0.807***  1.731***  0.032 
  (7.53)  (7.56)  (4.76)  (6.25)  (5.54)  (6.91)  (4.42)  (9.79)  (0.18) 
year93  -0.605**  -0.279  0.384*  0.061  0.303  -0.132  0.573***  -0.580***  1.252*** 
  (2.24)  (1.39)  (1.91)  (0.31)  (1.49)  (0.65)  (2.78)  (2.93)  (6.46) 
year95  -1.174***  -0.716***  -0.318**  -0.594***  -0.418***  -0.730***  -0.201  -0.963***  0.151 
  (5.47)  (4.62)  (2.04)  (3.82)  (2.66)  (4.62)  (1.24)  (6.27)  (1.01) 
year96  -0.942***  -1.097***  -1.045***  -1.056***  -1.080***  -1.080***  -1.058***  -1.092***  -0.815*** 
  (5.55)  (6.15)  (5.82)  (5.90)  (5.98)  (6.00)  (5.87)  (6.18)  (4.71) 
year97  -0.044  -0.062  -0.124  -0.104  -0.137  -0.096  -0.151  0.026  -0.195 
  (0.27)  (0.37)  (0.75)  (0.63)  (0.83)  (0.58)  (0.92)  (0.16)  (1.23) 
year99  0.000  -1.285***  -1.736***  -1.288***  -1.622***  -1.046***  -1.920***  -0.905***  -2.090*** 
  (.)  (5.40)  (7.04)  (5.40)  (6.26)  (4.13)  (7.26)  (3.80)  (8.93) 
Constant  9.810***  -3.053**  -4.602***  -0.058  -2.472  3.749**  -3.043*  3.303**  -7.804*** 
  (4.97)  (2.09)  (3.04)  (0.04)  (1.54)  (2.35)  (1.87)  (2.27)  (5.47) 
R-squared  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19  0.21  0.25 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses,* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, N.of observations (firms): 125 832 (15 555)   27
 
 
Table 3. Monetary Stance Variables Interacted with Firm Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: MIX1- Number of observations (firms): 125 832 (15 555) 
  Whole  Small  Large  Risky  Secure  Young  Old  Hindebted  Lindebted 
Tight Monetary Policy Regime Period, Including Tight Period Dummy in the Interaction Term  
BRATE  0.016**  -0.010**  -0.053***  -0.026***  -0.032***  -0.017***  -0.046***  -0.036***  -0.006 
BRATE*FCD*TP  -0.050***  -0.211***  0.157***  0.008  0.028**  -0.045***  0.045***  0.053***  -0.046*** 
FCD*TP  0.000  15.846***  -10.770***  -0.150  -1.272  1.559*  -1.559*  2.216**  -6.208*** 
Loose Monetary Policy Regime Period, Including Loose Period Dummy in the Interaction Term  
BRATE  -0.034***  -0.025***  -0.029***  -0.025***  -0.023***  -0.026***  -0.027***  -0.015***  -0.035*** 
BRATE*FCD*LP  0.050***  0.032**  -0.018*  0.017  -0.019*  0.026***  -0.026***  0.023**  -0.041*** 
FCD*LP  0.000  4.232***  -2.075***  0.903**  -0.067  1.086***  -1.086***  9.112***  -13.631*** 
Dependent Variable: MIX2- Number of observations (firms): 118 391 (15 377)  
Tight Monetary Policy Regime Period, Including Tight Period Dummy in the Interaction Term  
BRATE  0.005  -0.031***  -0.058***  -0.041***  -0.049***  -0.038***  -0.049***  -0.049***  -0.024*** 
BRATE*FCD*TP  -0.058***  -0.144***  0.104***  -0.009  0.029**  -0.023*  0.023*  0.013  -0.030** 
FCD*TP  0.000  11.727***  -8.496***  0.754  -1.162  1.697*  -1.697*  5.285***  -9.501*** 
Loose Monetary Policy Regime Period, Including Loose Period Dummy in the Interaction Term  
BRATE  -0.053***  -0.042***  -0.043***  -0.042***  -0.040***  -0.042***  -0.040***  -0.031***  -0.052*** 
BRATE*FCD*LP  0.058***  0.040***  -0.030***  0.014  -0.013  0.005  -0.005  0.028**  -0.035*** 
FCD*LP  0.000  2.065***  -1.166***  0.159  0.044  -0.144  0.144  8.989***  -15.750*** 
Dependent Variable: MIX3- Number of observations (firms): 113 505 (15 273) 
Tight Monetary Policy Regime Period, Including Tight Period Dummy in the Interaction Term  
BRATE  0.018*  0.003  -0.108***  -0.039***  -0.034***  -0.015*  -0.082***  -0.060***  0.015** 
BRATE*FCD*TP  -0.064***  -0.522***  0.323***  0.051**  0.007  -0.101***  0.101***  0.181***  -0.406*** 
FCD*TP  0.000  32.256***  -17.392***  -3.077*  -0.702  2.935**  -2.935**  -8.580***  20.192*** 
Loose Monetary Policy Regime Period, Including Loose Period Dummy in the Interaction Term  
BRATE  -0.046***  -0.030***  -0.048***  -0.032***  -0.033***  -0.033***  -0.044***  -0.029***  -0.034*** 
BRATE*FCD*LP  0.064***  -0.028  0.021  0.010  -0.011  0.034**  -0.034**  -0.018  0.021 
FCD*LP  0.000  4.590***  -5.640***  2.407***  -0.493  3.693***  -3.693***  2.482***  0.250 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses,  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
           
 
       